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Chapter 6 
Subnational participation in national decisions: the role of second chambers by Wilfried 
Swenden 
 
Second chambers have been among the most frequently described institutions of federal 
government. They are said to represent subnational interests (interests of the states, 
provinces, Länder, cantons, Autonomous Communities, Regions and Communities, 
Republics or oblasts) in decision-making at the national level. In the current context of 
multi-level governance, a growing number of policies cross-cut across levels (vertical 
entanglement) and policy sectors (horizontal entanglement). For instance, regulations to 
combat climate change, cross cut various ministerial departments (agriculture, 
environment, energy, transport, housing, finance) and levels of government (global, 
European, national, regional, local). In this contribution, we are only interested in the 
latter type, i.e. vertical coordination, with a special focus on patterns of state – sub-state 
(but supra-local) coordination. For instance, in climate change policy, the national level 
may play a key role in determining the appropriate national environmental targets and in 
representing its interests in supranational or global forums. However, it may not be able 
to reach these targets without the cooperation of subnational actors who are responsible 
for implementing them. Therefore, involving the latter in the process of setting climate 
change regulations is crucial if the state is to reach its objectives and fulfil its 
international commitments. Second chambers could be the structural or institutional 
intergovernmental device in which vertically joined-up policies such as climate change 
regulations are discussed and decided upon.  
 The key objectives of this chapter are (a) to provide an overview of the diversity 
of second chambers in terms of their composition and powers and (b) to consider the 
extent to which these features contribute to second chambers that are effectively 
representing subnational interests in policies of mutual central-regional concern. The 
chapter is divided in four sections. In the first section, I briefly demonstrate the clear 
connection between federalism and second chambers. In the subsequent section, I 
provide an overview of second chambers based on two key criteria: composition and 
powers. In the third section, I demonstrate how both of these criteria affect the role of 
second chambers as channels of subnational representation in national decision-making. 
The final section considers other institutional arrangements that could complement or 
substitute second chambers in their role of subnational representation.  
 
Federalism and second chambers 
In 2000, 66 states possessed a bicameral national legislature (Russell 2000: 25). Not all 
of these states are democracies and only a minority of them are federal democracies. 
Yet, the relationship between federalism and bicameralism is a strong one. As Table 1 
demonstrates there is not a single federal democracy without a second chamber, 
whereas unitary states (particularly when they are relatively small) frequently adopt a 
unicameral structure (Lijphart 1999: 200-215).  
 
 [About here: Table 1: The relationship between federalism and bicameralism] 
 
The strong relationship between federalism and bicameralism corresponds with the role 
federal theory attributes to second chambers in a multi-layered state. For instance, 
motivating the then still indirectly elected nature of the US Senate by state legislators, 
James Madison argued that the Senate would be able to give ‘state governments such an 
agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the 
former, and may form a convenient link between the two [federal and state] systems’ 
(Federalist No 62: 317). More recently, Watts and Smiley conceived of second 
chambers as one important mechanism of ‘intra-state federalism’. By this they mean a 
set of ‘devices and processes through which subnational interests are channelled into the 
operations of central government’ (Smiley and Watts 1985: xv). In other words, second 
chambers (may) give subnational actors (or their representatives) the ability to 
participate in federal decision-making on matters of subnational concern (Russell, 
2001).  
 Arguably federations that emerged from a ‘coming together’ of previously 
sovereign states expressed the strongest desire to have such mechanisms in place and 
phrased this as a precondition to pool or transfer sovereignty to a newly created federal 
state (Stepan 2001). Yet, it follows from Watts and Smiley’s definition that the need to 
establish mechanisms of intrastate federalism will be higher, the more the activities of 
the centre impinge on subnational interests. When the first federal second chambers 
emerged, federal centres tended to provide a limited set of tasks (national defence, 
national currency, foreign affairs, customs or excise). Today, most federal governments 
assume more important functions: often they raise the largest share of income, provide 
social security, set out a regulatory framework in policy areas which generate high 
levels of externalities (such as the environment or energy) or spend heavily on health or 
education. Sometimes these activities may directly encroach upon the domain of 
constitutionally allocated subnational competencies. Subnational governments which 
rely on federal income resources for half of their revenue or more, or which implement 
federal legislation as ‘agents’ of the federation will prefer to be involved in federal 
decisions that determine how much money will come their way or which federal 
policies they are expected to implement.  
 As the introduction to this volume made clear, in today’s complex environments 
all federal systems have grown away (albeit to varying degrees) from dual federalism. 
‘Marble cake’, ‘co-operative’ or even ‘organic’ have been listed as adjectives to capture 
the higher levels of interdependence between the centre and the subnational levels of 
government characterizing most contemporary federations (see Grodzins 1966; Sawer 
1976, Watts 1999, Hueglin and Fenna 2006: 145-178). Yet, a growing interdependence 
between levels could generate a process of centralization when the intrusion of the 
federal government in subnational policies is not offset by a strengthening of 
subnational influence in decision-making at the centre. However, do second chambers 
live up to their expected role of subnational representation at the centre?  
 The key argument of this chapter is that the extent to which second chambers 
effectively engage in subnational representation depends on whether its members have 
the ability (powers) and incentives to advance interests that are either linked to the 
subnational constituents whom they represent or to the collective, fiscal or 
administrative interests of a subnational (branch) of government with whom they can be 
associated. A first step therefore is to look at two classic variables on the basis of which 
bicameral legislatures are typically classified: composition and powers.  
 
The strength of bicameralism in federal democracies 
Although all federal democracies have a bicameral legislature, federal second chambers 
vary significantly in how they are composed and in the type of powers which they 
possess. Combining both variables, Lijphart has distinguished between strong and weak 
bicameralism. A bicameral system is strong when both chambers are composed on 
distinct principles yet share roughly equal powers (Lijphart 1999: 200-215).  
 There are several ways in which a second chamber can distinguish itself in 
compositional terms from the lower house. In general, lower houses are directly elected 
and tend to respect the principle of ‘one person, one vote’ (yet, Samuels and Snyder 
2001: 661 for some exceptions). By comparison, the election or renewal of the second 
chamber may not coincide with that of the lower house, its members may serve different 
(usually longer) terms, different age requirements may apply, and membership renewal 
of the second chamber may take on a ‘staggered’ character. Furthermore, elections to 
the second chamber may be held on the basis of a different electoral system. In addition, 
representation in the second chamber may not follow the principle of one person one 
vote, but favour the smaller subunits (in the extreme case by providing equal 
representation for each subunit irrespective of its demographic size in the federation; 
alternatively by over-representing the smaller units, yet not at the level of equal 
subnational representation (Samuels and Snyder 2001; Stepan and Swenden 1997, 
Stepan 2001: 344). Finally, several second chambers are indirectly elected, for instance 
by (and from within) the subnational legislatures or executives; a few of them are even 
appointed by the federal Prime Minister or government. 
 For bicameralism to be strong, the second chamber must have roughly the same 
powers as the lower house. Yet, in reality few second chambers are as powerful as the 
corresponding lower house. For instance, not all second chambers can introduce or 
amend legislation, veto legislation, convene a bicameral mediation committee, amend or 
veto budget of finance bills, determine their own agenda or decide on who will chair its 
committees. Similarly, not all second chambers are involved in amending the 
constitution, endorsing treaties or selecting high public officers such as ambassadors or 
members of the Constitutional Court.  
 When mapping bicameral strength for the countries that were listed in Table 1, we 
find that strong bicameralism is more likely to appear in federal democracies (as 
expected) but also that only half of the 12 federal democracies listed in that table have a 
strong bicameral legislature. Indeed, Table 2 summarizes the strength of bicameral 
legislatures based on their compositional distinctiveness and powers (in relation to the 
corresponding lower houses).
1
 Bicameralism is strong in Australia, Argentina, Brazil, 
Germany, USA and Switzerland strong, but much weaker in Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
India, Russia and Spain (Swenden 2004: 39).  
  [About here: Table 2: Bicameral strength in the most important federal 
 democracies] 
 
Table 2 also lists the ‘regime type’ of the political system in which the bicameral 
legislature is embedded. It is clear that all weak bicameral legislatures are nested in 
parliamentary federations. Conversely, with the exception of the Australian and German 
(and Swiss) bicameral legislatures, strong bicameralism is confined to presidential 
systems of government. Even the powers of the Australian and German second 
chambers are weaker in relation to their corresponding lower houses than that of the 
other second chambers listed among the group of strong bicameralism.  
 
 [About here: Table 3: Bicameral strength and its relationship with 
 parliamentarism / presidentialism (bicameral asymmetry in power is shaded)] 
 
The association between parliamentarism and weak bicameralism follows from the 
mutual dependence between cabinet or ‘government’ and legislature that characterize a 
parliamentary regime (Bergman, Müller and Strøm, 2003: 13). A Prime Minister and 
cabinet are politically accountable to any majority of members of parliament, with a risk 
of being outvoted by the latter through an ordinary or constructive vote of no-
confidence. By comparison, in a presidential system, the president and legislators are 
elected in separate elections and each of them serves fixed terms. The President cannot 
be removed from office, expect by Impeachment; the legislature cannot normally be 
dissolved by the President (Lijphart 1992).  
 The choice between parliamentarism and presidentialism has important 
implications for the design and strength of bicameralism. In a presidential system, two 
distinctively composed but equally powerful legislative chambers do not raise a 
problem of accountability because the president should not be held responsible to the 
legislature in the way in which a parliamentary executive requires the support of a 
legislative majority. As a result, both houses of a presidential legislature can be equally 
powerful since there is no clear ‘institutional’ rationale for why the second chamber 
should be made inferior to the lower house in terms of its legislative or budgetary 
powers. In practice, presidential second chambers can develop an important role as 
veto-players, but they also actively participate in policy setting (for instance by 
initiating a large number of bills). 
 In contrast, since a parliamentary executive requires the support of a legislative 
majority, parliamentary governments are usually held accountable to the lower house 
alone. The latter is always directly elected and its composition more closely 
approximates the principle of ‘one person, one vote’. Voting down budget bills is 
synonymous to withholding confidence in government; therefore most parliamentary 
systems deprive their second chamber from the right to veto, possibly even amend 
appropriation bills (see Howard and Saunders 1977: 251-302; Evans 1997: 93-102 on 
the right of the Australian Senate to block appropriation bills, the use of which 
provoked a constitutional crisis in 1975). Since the chain of accountability runs between 
the parliamentary executive and the lower house, an important dimension of bicameral 
asymmetry appears that is found missing from presidential regimes (see shaded areas in 
Table 3). Therefore, parliamentary second chambers often only have a suspensive veto-
right; they may delay or amend government legislation, but they do not initiate a large 
bulk of federal legislation themselves. Where they have more legislative powers, they 
are often composed in such a way that their political majority is likely to be congruent 
with that of the lower house (for exceptions see section 3). In this sense, parliamentary 
second chambers are generally more re-active than active, also in considering the extent 
to which federal policies touch upon subnational interests.  
 
Federalism, Second chambers and subnational representation  
The previous section provided a brief overview of bicameral strength, based on 
compositional distinctiveness and powers. Yet, how strong should a bicameral 
legislature be in order to make a substantial contribution to subnational representation? 
Furthermore, do all strong bicameral legislatures necessarily play a significant role from 
the viewpoint of subnational representation?  
 
Reflections on the powers of the second chamber 
First, irrespective of how a second chamber is composed, it will only have the ability to 
pursue such a role if it is sufficiently powerful. A second chamber without the ability to 
veto or delay federal decisions will only play a secondary role in subnational 
representation and other political institutions are likely to assume that role instead (see 
further). Having said this, not all the powers of second chambers are equally relevant 
from the viewpoint of subnational representation. For instance, should a second 
chamber have the right to veto appropriation bills which finance administrative 
departments and programs that are exclusively federal? Should it have the right to 
declare war or intervene in the appointment of ambassadors? Should it have the right to 
set up committees of inquiry to probe into federal expenditure programs? Arguably, 
second chambers that have these rights (such as the US Senate) are testimony to the 
more ‘multi-facetted’ role that the framers of the constitution may have had in mind 
with bicameralism. Indeed, second chambers could provide a more ‘detached’ view on 
policy matters, helped by the higher age requirements of their members or especially the 
longer terms which they serve. Hence, the ambition to make the second chamber play a 
significant role as a ‘house of review’ could have overshadowed, in some cases even 
dominated their assumed relevance from the viewpoint of subnational representation 
(e.g. Quick and Garran 1901, or Swift 1996 for an overview of the constitutional 
debates preceding the making of the Australian or US Senates respectively).  
 On the other hand, one would expect the second chamber to have a right to 
introduce, amend or veto constitutional changes that alter the balance of powers 
between the federal and regional levels of government; to co-decide on the regional 
distribution of federal grants or to influence the rate of federal taxes if part of their 
revenue accrues to the regions. On the basis of the summary overview in Table 2, only 
the powers of the Austrian and perhaps also the Spanish second chambers fall short 
from this perspective. De facto, the Canadian Senate can be added to this group; its 
nominated character had deprived it of much legitimacy and therefore its considerable 
powers have remained largely unused (Franks 1999 for a few recent exceptions). In 
general, the more a federation adopts the features of a co-operative or joint-decision 
federation, the stronger the required powers of the second chamber. The evolution of the 
powers of the German Bundesrat reflects the development of post-war German 
federalism from a co-operative to a ‘joint decision-making federation.’ When the 
members of the German parliamentary council debated the German ‘Basic Law’ in 
1948, they assumed that the consent of the second chamber would be required for about 
a third of all federal bills. Yet, more than 50 years later, the Bundesrat’s consent was 
needed for about 55-60 percent of all federal bills. This relative increase in powers 
reflects the growing involvement of the federal government in concurrent and 
framework legislation. It also illustrates the growing relevance of shared taxes, joint-
decision making tasks, or the increasing financial support of the federal government in 
assisting the Länder whenever they are charged with implementing federal legislation 
(Sturm 2001). Hence, in part, the strengthening of the centre has been offset by 
increasing the involvement of the Bundesrat in federal matters. This makes the process 
of German ‘centralization’ qualitatively different from, say, a similar process in Austria 
(where a transfer of competencies from the Länder to the federation was not offset by a 
collective decision-right on those matters at the federal level). Conversely, the most 
recent reforms of German federalism have reduced the level of ‘entanglement’ between 
the federal and subnational levels by returning some legislative powers to the Länder, a 
development that is said to bring the veto-powers of Bundesrat closer to (if still above) 
its originally intended levels (Hrbek 2006).  
 
Reflections on the composition of the second chamber 
Yet even if second chambers have the capacity to decide on matters that are relevant 
from the viewpoint of subnational representation, its members may not necessarily keep 
such concerns in mind. Therefore, and second, the incentives that drive the members of 
the second chamber derive at least in part from the way in which the second chamber is 
composed.  
 Also, in this respect, not each of the compositional features that were mentioned 
in Table 2 is of equal significance from the perspective of subnational representation. 
For instance, US senatorial terms are thrice as long as terms of representatives. 
Consequently, representatives are almost continuously embroiled in a re-election 
campaign, whereas (small state) senators are less dependent on party influence and 
constituency concerns, at least during the first couple of years after their election. Or, to 
list another example, the US congressional literature suggests that the success of a 
candidate will be associated more with and measured against ‘the state of the nation’, 
the larger is the constituency in which (s)he vies for election (Krasno 1994). With the 
exception of some of the smallest states that have twice or as many senators as 
representatives, lower house constituencies are sub-sets of senatorial constituencies. The 
latter typically coincide with the boundaries of a state. Therefore, senators are more 
likely to address ‘national’ concerns than representatives. Indeed, next to state 
governors or vice-presidents, senators are the most important position from which to 
launch a bid for the US presidency. This said, the ever more costly campaigns for the 
(re-)election of senators representing larges states have also gradually pushed forward 
the start of their election campaigns. Furthermore, while senators may think and act 
‘nationally’, the procedural rules of the US Senate leave more room for advancing 
specific state-concerns (for instance, filibustering or the occasional need for unanimous 
consent agreements to structure floor debate; Sinclair 1989). Chairs of powerful 
committees (the choice of membership which may reflect specific state interests) could 
also wield their influence to extract state specific interests (Peterson 1995).  
 Compared with the length of terms, two other compositional features are much 
more important as determinants of subnational representation. The first considers the 
extent to which the members of the second chamber possess strong incentives to lobby 
for subnational interests. This hinges in part on the geographic reach of the party which 
they represent, or in the case of nationwide parties, on their authority to act against the 
interests of the nationwide party. The second feature has been studied more extensively 
by legislative scholars, but loses much of its relevance if the incentives to ‘think and 
act’ subnationally are missing. It concerns the degree to which members of the smallest 
or over-represented units in the second chamber will use their disproportional influence 
in the chamber to advance specific territorial interests. I will discuss both elements in 
turn.  
 
A territorial incentive structure: members of the second chamber, party seniority and 
constituency ties 
Most members of a second chamber run on a party ticket. Even Canadian senators owe 
their appointment first and foremost to having served the party which controls the 
Canadian government at the moment of their selection (Franks 1999). Therefore we 
must look ‘inside’ the parties to assess the extent to which members of a second 
chamber can advance subnational interests. Two aspects are relevant here: (1) the 
dependence of members from regional parties or subnational party machines for their 
(re)selection or promotion within the party while in office; (2) the capacity of members 
of the second chamber to stand up against majority opinions of the federal party (in the 
lower house or second chamber). This hinges on their seniority within the party as a 
whole. 
 With respect to the first of these two elements, the method for electing second 
chambers is a crucial variable. Directly elected second chambers do not necessarily 
generate the strongest subnational ties. True, where such elections are by plurality vote 
and take place in constituencies that are congruent with the units of the federation (as in 
the US for instance), we find an incentive to cultivate a ‘personal’ and constituency 
specific vote. However, the direct election of the US Senate since 1913 (17
th
 
amendment) has reduced the dependence of senators from specific party concerns 
associated with their state. During the first half of the nineteenth century, US senators 
were not only elected by state legislatures but they were also subject to recall. Hence 
they could be forced to abide to specific state legislative instructions (Swift 1996: 32). 
The ‘recall’ requirement disappeared first, and gradually primaries came to replace 
selection by state legislatures. This method of selection freed senators from state party 
discipline, and, especially when their election coincides with that of the president 
allowed them to anticipate ‘presidential coattail effects.’ 
 In comparison, despite their direct election, Brazilian senators have remained 
more dependent from their state party machines. The presidential coattail effect is much 
weaker in Brazil than in the US. Brazilian senators are not pre-selected in open state 
primaries, but by a small group of state party leaders, depriving national party leaders of 
significant input (Samuels, 2000: 5). Rather than surfing on ‘presidential coattails’, 
Brazilian senators line up behind gubernatiorial candidates who have ‘the name 
recognition and organizational backing [clientelistic networks] that congressional 
candidates seek’ (Samuels, 2000: 6). Furthermore, unlike the US, Brazil lacks a two 
party system since congressional elections by (open-list) PR generate a multi-party 
system instead. Therefore, congressional elections are typically won on multi-party 
candidate lists and congressional candidates must vie for the attention of subnational 
party leaders to obtain eligible positions on these lists. Career patterns of senators and 
governors in the US more or less run on parallel tracks, but in Brazil, senators may have 
served as governors previously or aspire to a governorship after their senatorial terms. 
In sum, Brazilian senators are nested more strongly in state politics than their 
counterparts in the US and their prime loyalty remains towards the state even after their 
election to the Senate (Samuels, 2000: 16-17; Samuels and Mainwaring 2004: 98-99).  
 The US and Brazil are both presidential systems of government. Parties tend to be 
more disciplined and better organized in most parliamentary systems. In general, MPs 
in a parliamentary legislature have less scope to cultivate a personal vote, even where 
they are elected by first-past-the-post in single member electoral districts (Cain, 
Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987). True, some parliamentary parties may have a territorially 
concentrated support base (for instance, ethno-regionalist parties such as the Scottish 
National Party or the Bloc Québecois). Alternatively, national parties may have strong 
subnational party branches that play a key role in selecting candidates for second 
chamber elections as a result of which the latter can be expected to pay allegiance to 
subnational party interests. Arguably, that allegiance is strongest for second chambers 
that are indirectly elected by or/and from within regional parliaments or executives. For 
instance, this is the case for the German and Indian second chambers. The composition 
of these second chambers depends on the outcome of regional elections, and subnational 
party branches are more likely to select candidates or draft party manifestos for said 
elections. The allegiance to subnational policy levels will be lower among the group of 
directly elected parliamentary Senates. Normally, their election coincides with elections 
for the politically more significant lower chamber. Therefore, parties seeking to gain 
votes in both elections are under strong pressure to make Senate campaigns congruent 
with the themes that dominate the election of the lower house.  
 In general, members of parliamentary second chambers will be under stronger 
pressure than their counterparts in presidential systems to display cohesive voting 
behaviour. This is so because the battle between government and opposition in the 
federal lower house is likely to spill over into second chamber politics. As Sawer once 
put it, to the extent that the same parties are represented in both chambers of a 
parliamentary bicameral legislature, ‘the politics of federalism [in the second chamber] 
may have been abandoned for the politics of keeping a particular party [or parties] in 
office [government]’ (Sawer, 1969: 42). Conversely, members of a parliamentary 
second chamber who represent federal opposition parties may abandon the politics of 
federalism for the politics of ‘frustrating’ or ‘holding to account’ a particular party or 
party coalition in federal government. In this fight, the federal government holds two 
important advantages.  
 First, it possesses a legitimacy bonus, since it can invoke the legislative support of 
a directly elected legislative majority in the (more proportionally composed and directly 
elected) lower house. The federal government’s ‘electoral mandate’ forces 
parliamentary second chambers to act cautiously, even if they were to invoke their role 
as vehicles of subnational representation. Second, the federal parliamentary executive is 
likely to have critical resource advantages: strong administrative support from 
ministerial cabinets or ministries that members of the legislature without a post in 
government lack. Therefore, the role of the second chamber will be confined primarily 
to formulate policy preferences in response to proposed government policy, irrespective 
of whether these proposals relate to a recalibration of federal-regional relations in the 
state. In this sense, parliamentary second chambers are more reactive compared with 
their presidential counterparts.  
 The latter point is important, because it explains the ‘extra-ordinary’ position of 
the German Bundesrat among the group of parliamentary second chambers. The 
requirement of regional block voting, and especially its composition of regional 
executive members strengthens the capacity of the second chamber in subnational 
representation. Regional executive leaders are senior figures within their respective 
party organizations and they have some authority to speak up against the preferences of 
the major party protagonists in the federal executive and lower house. In fact, members 
of the Bundesrat frequently assume important positions in the federal party 
organizations (especially the Parteivorstand or party executive). Furthermore, as 
regional executive leaders, the members of the Bundesrat have the administrative 
support that most of their colleagues in the other parliamentary second chambers can 
only dream of. This enables them to influence federal policy-making earlier and more 
profoundly than their counterparts in other parliamentary second chambers. Finally, the 
composition of the German Bundesrat confirms the dominant pattern of 
intergovernmental relations in parliamentary federations: intergovernmental relations as 
inter-executive driven relations (Smiley and Watts 1985).  
 Of course, most members of the Bundesrat also pay loyalty to the national 
interests of the party family to which they belong, especially when they have set their 
eyes on a role in federal government or combine their function as subnational (Land) 
executive leaders with that of federal opposition leaders. Furthermore, the members of 
the Bundesrat frequently convene in de facto party meetings, sometimes in the presence 
of the Chancellor or the opposition leaders in the lower house (Leonardy, 2002). In light 
thereof, the Bundesrat is frequently criticized for ‘playing federal party politics’, 
especially when the party political composition of the second chamber is incongruent to 
that of the federal executive and the second chamber is seen as a major brake on 
planned federal government policy (Fromme 1981, Lehmbruch 1998; Jeffery 1999; 
Scharpf 2005). Although an in-depth analysis to prove the validity of these accusations 
falls beyond the scope of this chapter, one should distinguish between two types of 
‘obstructionism’ (for a summary of both arguments, see Swenden 2006: 213-219).  
 A first type is clearly linked to national party political strategies. It arises when a 
federal government faces a party politically hostile second chamber and accuses the 
Bundesrat of preventing it from implementing the policy proposals (‘the policy 
mandate’) on which it was elected. Alternatively, the federal government can play the 
‘blame game’ and use party political incongruence to cover up intra-party 
disagreements or a fall out with its federal coalition partner (Scharpf 1988).  
 A second type of ‘obstructionism’ arises when the Bundesrat pursues its role as an 
articulator of subnational interests. This is the type of behaviour that federal theory 
expects from a second chamber.
2
 Bicameral disagreement that is linked to different 
territorial interests within as well as between parties in federal government or 
opposition has increased in the past twenty years, especially on fiscal issues (Gunlicks 
2002). Partly, this reflects the growing territorial socio-economic heterogeneity of 
Germany following unification. The dividing lines in the Bundesrat can pit Land 
governments that are controlled by the same political party/parties against each other.  
 It is interesting to contrast the role of the German Bundesrat in subnational 
representation with that of other parliamentary second chambers (even the indirectly 
elected ones). For instance, with some exceptions, Australian senators generally defer to 
the wishes of their party colleagues in the lower house because the more senior party 
figures (Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition, the Deputy 
leader of the shadow cabinet) reside there (Jaensch 1986; 1994). These party leaders can 
promote obedient senators to the frontbench, and enforce party discipline trough internal 
party rules (especially in the case of the Australian Labor Party). 
 
Second Chambers and the Over-representation of the smallest units  
Arguably, one of the most studied aspects of federal second chambers is the extent to 
which they overrepresent the smallest subunits in the state (Stepan 2001; Samuels and 
Snyder 2001).
3
 Such overrepresentation could turn the second chamber into a body 
which disproportionally advances the interests of small states. For instance, on the basis 
of how many members of the second chamber are needed to make valid decisions 
(quorum of attendance) for ordinary legislation or constitutional amendments, one could 
calculate the number of senators that is needed to approve legislation or block 
constitutional change. In Australia, Senate legislation can be approved by a small group 
of 14 Australian senators comprising just each of the twelve Tasmanian senators and 
both senators representing the Northern Territory. Jointly, they represent a mere 3.57 
percent of the Australian population. Similarly, in the German Bundesrat, the 
delegations of the ten smallest Länder, representing just 28.7 percent of the population 
are sufficiently strong to halt federal bills that require the consent of the Bundesrat 
(Swenden, 2004: 132-134).  
 Yet, the consequences of ‘equal or weighted’ as opposed to ‘proportional’ 
subnational representation should be interpreted in light of the fact that voting is often 
by party and not by region. As mentioned above, in parliamentary systems this is more 
often norm than exception. Hence, not all senators from the same subunits represent 
similar parties; for instance, the votes of the twelve Tasmanian senators are split 
between Labor, the Liberals and possibly some independents. Furthermore, the ten 
smallest German regions (comprising for instance affluent Hamburg and relatively poor 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) do not necessarily share the same interests and thus may 
not cast identical votes in the Bundesrat. Although these observations put ‘the problem’ 
of overrepresentation into perspective, when assessing its implications for subnational 
representation we should take the following four observations into account. 
 First, qualifying the point that was raised above, even if parties are cohesive and 
nation-wide, the effect of over-representing the smallest units in the second chamber 
cannot be ignored completely. This is best documented for some of the presidential 
second chambers. For instance, the provision of equal state representation in the US 
Senate, combined with the importance of seniority in the membership or chair of 
relevant senatorial committees has given small state senators - especially when 
occupying important committee positions – the leverage to ‘bring home’ distributive 
programs that disproportionately benefit the interests of their state constituents (Baker 
1995; Peterson 1995: 140, 145-146; Lee and Oppenheimer 1998). The effect of equal 
subnational Senate representation has also been noted in the policy outputs of the 
Brazilian, Argentinean and Swiss second chambers (Diaz Cayeros 2006: 225; Gordin, 
2010, Vatter 2004). Gordin has demonstrated that senators from over-represented 
Argentinean provinces have been allowed to incur higher deficits or more easily 
encountered the president’s goodwill to bail out such deficits, especially when sharing 
the presidential party label (Gordin, 2010). In Switzerland, the small cantons tend to be 
more rural and conservative; therefore their over-representation in the Council of States 
has provided a buffer against the progressive welfare policies that are propagated by the 
urban (and Social-Democratic) cantons (Obinger, Armingeon, Bonoli and Bertozzi, 
2005: 263-306).  
 Second, federations develop over time. Therefore, mechanisms that once seemed 
to protect territorial minority interests may lose that quality with the demise or arrival of 
new cleavages. For instance, in Switzerland, the Catholics were the most salient 
minority when the Swiss ‘confederation’ was born. By today, the Catholic-Protestant 
divide has lost most of its salience. Arguably, the over-representation of the Catholic-
conservative cantons in the second chamber was warranted, especially since several 
cantons sought secession from the Swiss confederation during the Sonderbund War 
(Vatter, 2004: 7). However, the second chamber cannot be said to protect linguistic 
interests very well, even if language has overtaken religion as the most important 
cleavage. The over-representation of the smallest cantons does not benefit the French- 
or Italian-speaking Swiss minority populations who live concentrated in more densely 
populated, and therefore under-represented cantons.  
 Third, the overrepresentation of the smallest units may work to the benefit of 
minorities but only when these are territorially concentrated and make up a (political) 
majority in the territories in which they are found. For instance, the ‘Southern 
Democrats’ who controlled the over-represented Southern US states used their seniority 
in the Senate to halt affirmative action programs that would stand to benefit black 
citizens from these states. This was so despite the higher representation of blacks in 
these states (discrimination was meant to protect cheap black labour as a source of 
economic competitiveness; Pierson 1995). Similarly, the dominance of rural and 
bourgeois parties in the Swiss second chamber is said to have exacerbated the under-
representation of women there (Vatter, 2005: 208). In Australia, the provision of equal 
state representation has not served Aboriginals well since the opposition to pro-
Aboriginal policies has generally been stronger in Western Australia and Queensland, 
two states that were over-represented in the Senate, at least until the mid 20
th
 century. 
 Finally, the consequences of over-representing the smallest units in the second 
chamber are more frequently overlooked for parliamentary federations since 
representation is more by party than by region. A notable exception is the German 
Bundesrat due to the constitutional obligation to cast a uniform regional block vote 
there. Yet, even if representation is more by party, over-representing the smallest units 
can still generate significant consequences in two important ways. First, it can affect the 
party political balance between both chambers. For instance, Australian governments 
have been a few seats short of a majority in the Senate for most of the time post 1949. 
Although Senate elections by Proportional Representation (compared with lower house 
elections by the alternative vote, a majoritarian electoral system) are the main cause for 
this lack of Senate majority, equal state representation has played a role as well. For 
instance, between July 1996 and July 1999, the Australian government (Liberal-
National) was two votes short of a Senate majority. In this period the government 
frequently relied on the support of two independent senators, one of whom represented 
the smallest (island) state of Tasmania. Had the Senate been composed on the basis of 
proportional subnational representation, Tasmania would not have been entitled to 12 
but only two senators. In that case, the independent Tasmanian senator would not have 
been elected and the Liberal and Labor parties would have been able to benefit from 
their more concentrated following in some of the large and currently under-represented 
states. Second, where parliamentary second chambers are directly elected (as in 
Australia), federal governments can draw from the contingent of party senators 
representing the smallest units in order to build a cabinet that incorporates MPs from all 
the units of the federation. In Australia, there is at least an expectation that the 
government comprises MPs from the smallest states. 
 
Alternative channels of subnational representation  
While all examples of strong bicameralism are situated in federal states, not all federal 
states have strong bicameral legislatures. Furthermore, the above analysis illustrated 
that several federal second chambers fall short in their role of subnational 
representation. If second chambers fail to represent subnational interests in federal 
decision-making, what are the alternatives? Kenneth Wheare once argued that while the 
method of safeguarding regional interests via a federal second chamber is advisable, 
‘federal government does not necessarily work badly without it’ (Wheare 1963: 90).  
 Second chambers are only one method of joining up politics and policies across 
different levels. In parliamentary federations, where second chambers tend to be 
weakest, intergovernmental relations often take the form of inter-executive relations, 
confirming their characterization as ‘executive’ federations (Watts 1999). At the apex, 
executive summits bring together the federal Prime Minister or ministers from the 
federal or subnational governments or the regional Premiers alone. Examples of such 
meetings are the Premiers Conferences in Canada, the Council of Australian 
Governments in Australia, or the Conference of Education and Culture ministers in 
Germany (Kultusministerkonferenz). Hence, such inter-executive meetings even 
developed in Germany, notwithstanding the key role of the Bundesrat. 
 Executive summitry meetings are of course prepared and paralleled by gatherings 
that bring together civil servants from various (levels of) government(s). Examples are 
the Landesreferenten in Austria, the close to thousand discussion and working groups of 
administrative experts from the federal and Land levels in Germany, or the expert 
committees drawing Swiss cantonal representatives into the preparatory stage of federal 
lawmaking (Kramer 2005: 132; Wälti 1996: 204). However, not all parliamentary states 
with a relatively weak second chamber can take recourse to institutionalized and 
formalized ‘intergovernmental’ alternatives of the type found in Canada, Austria or 
Australia (Bolleyer 2006a; 2006b).  
 In Spain for instance, inter-executive coordination mechanisms or sectoral 
conferences that bring together civil servants or ministers from the various autonomous 
communities are not always attended by executive representatives from all the regions 
and such conferences may lack the power to issue binding decisions (Grau í Creus, 
2000). Furthermore the historic communities have frequently preferred a strategy of 
bilateralism, seeking recognition as special regions (or rather nations) within the state. 
In this sense, strengthening the Spanish Senate may not be an attractive alternative, for 
it would mean that these sub-state nations may have to give up some of these bilateral 
ties with the centre in exchange for a Senate that would act as the collective defender of 
subnational interests (Juberías, 1999; Roller 2002). Senate reform has also featured on 
the agenda of Canadian and Belgian constitutional reformers (Vanhee 2003, Smith 
2007, Verhofstadt 2008), but as in Spain these reforms have stalled. A federal second 
chamber that would be more effective in regional representation could challenge the 
role of its current members (who may have to seek refuge elsewhere) or undermine the 
authority of the federal government. In a plurinational federation like Canada, Quebec 
may ask for a right to veto Senate decisions, much like what the historic communities 
aspire to in the Spanish context. Furthermore, Senate reform is often part of a wider 
constitutional agenda. Therefore, its success frequently depends on concrete 
achievements in other domains (such as electoral reform, or a constitutional reordering 
of competencies).  
 As federal states continue to (re)distribute authority vertically and horizontally, 
the role of second chambers in subnational representation will remain at the heart of the 
debate on institutional engineering in federal states. In light of the growing importance 
of subnational authority across the world (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2008), 
subnational authorities elsewhere may try to ‘break’ their way into or increase their 
voice at the national policy level. They may also use the second chamber as a vehicle to 
increase their leverage in EU or international affairs by seeking to affect the position of 
the national executive. The role of second chambers in subnational representation is not 
only an issue of relevance for federal states, but also for the unitary or decentralized 
states that have strengthened the role of subnational authorities (regional or local 
government) in recent decades. For instance, in France the Senate has been interpreted 
as a chamber that represents local and agrarian interests, due to its link with local 
government and the overrepresentation of senators from small, agrarian communities 
(Loughlin 2007). A closer study of multi-level governance in Scandinavia can show 
insight into how intergovernmental coordination takes place without the presence of a 
second chamber.  
 This chapter has demonstrated that second chambers in federal states are hugely 
diverse in terms of composition, power and the way in which their members relate to 
the overall party system. Jointly, these factors determine the capacity of second 
chambers for representing subnational interests in federal decision-making. That 
capacity varies significantly from federation to federation, but where it is weak, 
alternative structures and channels of multi-level coordination may have developed. As 
a result, second chambers should neither be seen as a necessary nor as a sufficient 
condition for the proper functioning of multi-level governance. They can play an 
important role in this regard, but it depends.  
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Table 1: The relationship between federalism and bicameralism  
 
 Federal Democracies Non-Federal Democracies 
Unicameral 
Legislatures 
 Costa Rica 
Denmark 
Finland 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Israel 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Mauritius 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Sweden 
Bicameral 
Legislatures 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Canada 
Germany 
India 
Russia 
Spain 
Switzerland 
USA 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Botswana 
Colombia 
Czech 
Republic 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
The 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Trinidad 
UK 
Source: Swenden (2004): 26 
 
Table 2: Bicameral strength in the most important federal democracies 
 
Second 
Chamber/ 
Regime Type 
Composition Powers Bicameral 
Strength 
Significance from the 
viewpoint of 
subnational 
representation 
US Senate 
Presidential 
Directly elected 
Equal state 
representation 
 
 
Distinctiveness: 
Moderate 
Co-equal (but money 
bills introduced in lower 
house) 
Superior role in approval 
Treaties + executive or 
judicial nominations 
Bicameral Symmetry 
High Moderate 
Brazilian Senate 
Presidential 
Directly elected  
(by simple plurality) 
Equal state 
representation 
Distinctiveness: High 
Co-equal  
+ executive or judicial 
nominations 
 
Bicameral Symmetry 
High High 
Argentinean 
Senate 
Presidential 
Directly elected  
(in part by PR) 
Equal state 
representation 
 
 
 
Distinctiveness: High 
Money-bills introduced 
in lower house;  
Co-equal, originating 
house of legislation takes 
final decision but 
requires (2/3 or absolute) 
majority to overturn 
opinion non-originating 
chamber 
+ executive or judicial 
nominations 
Bicameral Symmetry 
High  High 
Swiss Ständerat 
Hybrid 
Directly elected  
(by plurality vote) 
Equal state 
representation  
(except for half-cantons) 
Distinctiveness: High 
Money bills introduced 
in lower house;  
bicameral disagreements 
require conference 
committee meeting and 
subsequent vote by each 
chamber  
Bicameral Symmetry 
High Moderate 
Australian Senate 
Parliamentary 
Directly elected (by PR) 
Equal state 
representation (lower 
representation for 
territories) 
 
Money bills introduced 
in lower house, but 
appropriation bills can be 
vetoed by Senate 
Navette + possibility of 
joint dissolution to sort 
High  Low-Moderate 
Distinctiveness: High out bicameral 
disagreements 
Moderate bicameral 
asymmetry 
German 
Bundesrat 
Parliamentary 
Indirectly elected 
(regional executives) 
Weighted state 
representation 
 
 
 
 
 
Distinctiveness: High 
 
No vote of confidence + 
suspensive veto against 
federal appropriation 
bills 
Absolute veto in 
approximately 55 percent 
of legislation 
Concertation Committee 
to sort out bicameral 
disagreements + 
subsequent vote by each 
chamber 
Moderate bicameral 
asymmetry 
High  Moderate-High 
Indian Rajya 
Sabha 
Parliamentary 
Indirectly elected 
(regional legislatures) 
Weighted state 
representation 
 
 
 
 
Distinctiveness High 
No votes of confidence 
in government 
No right to amend or 
introduce money bills 
(only pass on comments) 
Right to amend other 
bills, but disagreements 
are decided by majority 
vote in joint sitting (in 
which more populous 
lower house dominates)  
Bicameral Asymmetry 
Moderately 
Strong 
Moderate 
Canadian Senate 
Parliamentary 
Appointed by Governor 
General (in practice 
Canadian Prime 
Minister) 
Representation by 
‘Region’ 
 
 
Distinctiveness High  
Money bills introduced 
in lower house, Senate 
can amend but not 
increase money bills sent 
up from lower house 
Veto right in other 
matters  
Moderate Bicameral 
Asymmetry; however, 
powers largely unused 
due to legitimacy deficit  
‘High’ (de 
facto Low, 
due to 
constrained or 
almost unused 
powers)  
Low 
Russian 
Federation 
Council 
Semi/ ‘Super’ 
Presidential 
Equal state 
representation, one 
delegated by regional 
executive, the other by 
subnational legislature 
Distinctiveness: High 
[de facto, lower due to 
presidential grip on 
nominations]* 
No votes of confidence 
in government 
Veto-right constrained to 
matters affecting state-
regional relations + 
suspensive veto in other 
matters 
Moderate Bicameral 
Asymmetry 
Moderately 
Strong 
Moderate 
Belgian Senate 
Parliamentary 
40/71 directly elected 
simultaneous with lower 
house;  
21/71 indirectly elected 
from within regional 
(Community) 
parliaments 
10 co-opted by directly 
and indirectly elected 
senators 
(+ senators by right: 
sons/daughters of the 
ruling monarch)  
Mostly Proportional 
Subnational 
representation 
Distinctiveness: Low  
No votes of confidence 
in government 
No votes on budget 
Veto right in 
constitutional matters, 
constitutional laws 
(requiring special 
majorities) and generally 
one third of federal 
legislation 
Suspensive veto right in 
other matters 
 
 
 
 
Moderate Bicameral 
Asymmetry 
 
Weak Low 
Spanish Senate 208, directly elected No votes of confidence Weak  Low 
Parliamentary simulateneous with 
lower house 
49 appointed by and 
from within regional 
parliaments 
 
 
 
Distinctiveness: Low  
 
in government and 
statewide budget;  
Veto right in 
constitutional matters, 
state of emergency or 
approving coercive 
measures against 
subnational government 
acting against Spanish 
national interest 
Suspensive veto right in 
other matters 
High Bicameral 
Asymmetry 
Austrian 
Bundesrat 
Parliamentary 
Indirectly elected by 
regional legislatures 
Weighted  subnational 
representation 
 
 
 
 
Distinctiveness: 
Moderate 
No votes of confidence 
in government or budget 
Veto right on 
constitutional matters 
altering the distribution 
of competencies between 
the centre and the 
regions 
Suspensive veto right in 
other matters (can be 
overturned by lower 
house with simple 
majority) 
High Bicameral 
Asymmetry  
Weak  Low  
(1) Note, unless electoral system is mentioned, lower house and second chamber are elected on the basis of similar 
electoral systems.  
 
(*) Regional governors and chairs of regional assemblies lost their right to sit in the second chamber and were 
replaced by delegates (of the governor and regional legislatures). A decision by Putin in 2004 to appoint governors 
(as his representatives) further weakened the Federation Council by strengthening the grip of the President on that 
chamber’s composition (Gill 2007: 7-8)  
 
Table 3: Bicameral strength and its relationship with parliamentarism / presidentialism 
(bicameral asymmetry in power is shaded)  
 
 Parliamentar
ism 
Presidential
ism 
Lo
wer 
Ho
use  
Up
per 
Ho
use 
Lo
wer 
H
ouse 
U
pper 
H
ouse 
Political Accountability (Censure vote leading to government 
resignation) 
Y
ES 
N
O 
N
O 
N
O 
Absolute Veto Power in Executive Maintenance 
(federal budget bills) 
 YES NO YES YES 
Powers in general Lawmaking  YES  YES YES YES 
 
 
ENDNOTES  
                                                 
1
 Since the powers and composition of these upper houses has already been discussed 
extensively in the comparative literature I summarize their main features here without 
going into further detail (For general comparative overviews see for instance Tsebelis 
                                                                                                                                               
and Money 1997; Lijphart, 1999; Patterson and Mughan 1999; Russell 2000, Riescher, 
Ruß and Haas 2000; Baldwin and Shell 2001; Llanos and Nolte 2003; Swenden 2004; 
Luther, Passaglia and Tarchi 2006; Uhr 2006, Watts 2007). 
 
2
 For instance, when the German Christian-Democrats (CDU-CSU) possessed 
comfortable majorities in the lower house and Bundesrat (from 1982 until 1987), the 
then Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) successfully kept as many issues of bicameral 
disagreement as possible out of the ‘bicameral concertation committee’. Instead, he 
preferred to resolve them in internal party meetings with his CDU-CSU controlled 
regional governments (Klatt 1999; Lehmbruch 1998: 160-161). Occasionally 
compromise meant backtracking on proposed reforms in the health care, postal or 
communications sectors. Sometimes compromise could only achieved by ‘buying’ the 
support of one or several CDU regions, for instance by offering them disproportionate 
receipts of equalization payments (some of these practices were later declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court; Renzsch 1989: 333-345). 
 
3
 In recent years, the empirical political science literature has increasingly 
‘problematized’ the over-representation (‘malapportionment’) of small units in a federal 
second chamber (Stepan 2001; Samuels and Snyder 2001; Gordin, 2010). Such a 
viewpoint contrasts with the rationale of more traditional accounts of federalism which 
have argued that over-representation protects small units against majority rule and 
strengthens their loyalty vis-à-vis the federation (Elazar 1987; Burgess, 2006). 
